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DRAWING THE LINE -
BALANCING RELIGIOUS VILIFICATION
LAWS AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH I
Geoff Holland'
Tolerance has become part of the language of human rights, the antithesisof discrimination, persecution, and vilification. In a culturally diverse
society like Australia, it is essential for social cohesion. Legislators have
considered it a sufficiently desirable social outcome to justify anti-
discrimination and anti-vilification laws. However, legislating for tolerance
is not without controversy. In recent years, the most controversial laws
have been those prohibiting speech that vilifies another because of his or
her religious beliefs. A tolerant society also needs to balance the competing
public interests of social cohesion with that of freedom of speech, and this
has been a challenge for legislatures and the judiciary alike.
In late 2005, the publication of a series of cartoons depicting the Islamic
prophet Mohammed caused international controversy that resulted in
some violent protests, particularly against Danish interests. Using this
controversy as the focal point, I analyse the debate surrounding the
publication of these cartoons and compare the legislative responses to
religious vilification in Australia and Denmark. Would publication of
the cartoons in Australia have amounted to religious vilification under
current legislation? Should they? Consideration is also given to the self-
imposed limits of the press in the publication of material that is critical
of or offensive to a segment of society.
The Background to the Controversy
On IS September 2005, Politiken, a Danish newspaper, published an article
entitled Profound Fear of Criticism of Islam ,3 discussing the difficulty of an
author, Kare Bluitgen, in finding an illustrator willing to work on a planned
children's book on the life of Mohammed." The Politiken article alleged that
artists refused to undertake the work out of fear of offending Muslims."
Shortly thereafter fyllands-Posten, another Danish newspaper, owned by
I This article is drawn from a larger research project currently being undertaken into the
state of freedom of speech in Australia in the first years of the 21st century
2 BA (Communications), LLB (Hons) Grad Cert Leg Prac (UTS). Lecturer, Faculty of
Law, University of Technology, Sydney,
3 Dyb Angst For Kritik. Af Islam, Politiken, September 15,2005,
4 Keranen og profeten Mohammeds liv fortreIling efter islams seldste kilder, translated as
The Quran and the Life of the Prophet Muhammad.
5 Dyb Angst For Kritik Ai Islam, Politiken, September 15, 2005,
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the same media corporation as Politikens invited a number of cartoonists
to submit works depicting Mohammed to accompany an article on self-
censorship. On 30 September 2005, [yllands-Posten published an article
entitled The Face of Mohammed,' critical of self-censorship imposed out of
a fear of a backlash from Muslims. In the introduction to the article the
author, Culture Editor for [yllands-Posten, Flemming Rose wrote: '
The fact is that the fear does exist and that it leads to self-censorship.
The public space is being intimidated. Artists, authors, illustrators,
translators, and people in theatre are therefore steering a wide berth around
the most important meeting of cultures in our time - the meeting between
Islam and the secular society of the West, which is rooted in Christianity."
Accompanying the article were twelve cartoons. Included among the
cartoons were the face of a man, drawn within a crescent moon and star
the face of a bearded man with a turban shaped like an ignited bomb;
five female figures wearing headscarves, with facial features depicted as a
star and a crescent moon, the caption reading: "Prophet! You crary bloke!
Keeping women under theyoke!"; a man with beads of sweat on his brow,
sitting under a lighted lamp and looking over his left shoulder as he draws
a man's face with a head covering and beard; two bearded men wearing
turbans carrying a sword, a bomb and a gun, running towards a third man
wearing a turban reading a sheet of paper, who motions them to stop, with
the words "Relax folks! It's just a sketch made by an unbelieverfrom southern
Denmark"; and a bearded man wearing a turban and standing on clouds
with arms outspread, facing a row of men in tattered clothes with rising
smoke over their heads, saying: "Stop, stop, we ran out of virgins!".9
. In mid-October 2005, several thousand people demonstrated peacefully
In Copenhagen against the publication. After a refusal by the Danish
Prime Minister, Anders Fogh, to intervene and censor [yllands-Posten, a
number of organizations representing Muslims lodged a complaint with the
Danish Police, alleging a breach of the Danish Criminal Code. 10 Starting in
November 2005, newspapers throughout Europe, Asia, and North America
re-published the images, triggering more protests throughout December
2005 and January 200611 The protests continued throughout February
and were overwhelmingly peaceful. However, on 3 February, the Danish
Embassy in Jakarta was attacked by protesters, and in the following days
the Embassies of Denmark and other countries where the cartoons had
been republished were also attacked. 12
Comparing the Legal Responses
Freedom of speech is a fundamental right under Danish law. Section
77 of the Danish Constitution provides that "Any person shall be entitled to
publish his thoughts in printing, in writing, and in speech,provided that he mqy
be held answerable in a court of justice. Censorship and other preventive measures
shall never again be introduced." This provides a procedural protection
of speech, a prohibition of prior restraints, and dates from 1849 when
freedom from censorship was perceived as the primary issue in freedom
of speech. 13 However, the wording expressly indicates an intention by the
framer~ o~the Constitution that speech is subject to other laws, including
the Criminal Code (Straffeloven). As a member of the European Union,
Denmark's obligations arise under the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR). Article 10 (1) of the Convention provides that "Everyone
has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers." Under Article
10 (2), the exercise of the Convention's freedoms are subject to "duties
and responsibilities" necessary for a legitimate purpose, including the
protection of the reputation or rights of others.'! Therefore, neither of
these protections of speech is absolute, enabling the Danish legislature to
restrict speech where it is considered necessary. For that reason, Danish
Courts have considered freedom of expression to be an important individual
right when assessing the validity of laws restricting speech, but, at the
same time, have acknowledged a legal obligation to restrict speech or
expressive conduct that is gratuitously offensive to others and that in no
way contributes to public debate. 15
In October 2005 a complaint was lodged with Danish police, claiming
thatfyllands-Posten committed an offence under the Danish Criminal Code,
alleging an infringement of sections 140 and 266. Section 140 is contained
12 On 4 February 2006 the Norwegian, Danish, Swedish, and Chilean Embassies in
Damascus were firebombed, and on 5 February the Danish General Consulate in Beirut was
set on fire. See <www.smh.com.au!articles/2006/02/06/1 139074l37551.html> accessed
28 September 2006; and Timeline: The Muhammad Cartoons, The Times Online, 6 February
2006 at <http://www.timesonline.co.uk!article/0 ..3-2021760.00.html> accessed 29 Sep-
tember 2006. Interestingly, international media coverage of this issue appeared to focus on
the violent protests, with little reporting of the majority of protests conducted peacefulIy.
13 Peter Germer, Ytringsfrihedens vresen, Juristforbundets Forlag, Copenhagen. 1973,209
as cited in Brief on Freedom of Expression, The Danish Institute for Human Rights,
29 September 2006, available at <http://www.humanrights.dk/news/briefs/briefs 011>
accessed 29 September 2006. -
14 The Sunday Times v The United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, Application
No. 6538/74, 26 April 1979; (1979) 2 EHRR 245.
15 Response by the Danish Government to UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Religion or Belief, 26 January 2006, available at
<http://www.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/00D9E6F7 -32DC-4C5A-8E24-FOC96E813C06/0/
060123final.pdf> accessed 28 September 2006.
6 JP/Politikens Hus.
7 Mohammeds Ansigt, [yllands-Posten, September 30,2005.
8 Ibid.
9 The cartoons were widely distributed on the Internet, e.g. <http://blog.newspaperindex.
com/2 005/1 2/ 1O/un -to- investiga te- jyllands-posten -racism!> .
10 Possible Criminal Proceedings in the Case of [yllands-Posten Article "The Face of Mohammed",
The Director Of Public Prosecutions (Denmark), File No. RA-2006-41-0151, 15 March
2006, available at <http://www.rigsadvokaten.dk/media/bilagiafgorelse engelsk.pdf>
accessed 28 September 2006. -
11 Timeline: The Muhammad Cartoons, The Times Online, 6 February 2006 at <http://www.
timesonline.co. uk/article/0,,3-20217 60,00.h tml >.
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in Chapter 15 of the Code, which is sub-headed "Crimes against the public
order and peace," and provides that:
Any person who, in public, mocks or scorns the religious doctrines or acts of
worship of any lawfully existing religious community in this country shall be
liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding four months.
The use of the phrase "mocks or scorns the religious doctrines or acts
of worship" indicates that the interest protected is religious feeling, in as
far as it is connected to the doctrines and worship of the religion. 16 Section
266b( I) provides that: .
Any person who, publicly or with the intention of wider dissemination,
makes a statement or imparts other information by which a group of
people are threatened, scorned or degraded on account of their race, colour,
national or ethnic origin, religion, or sexual inclination shall be liable to a
fine or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding two years.
The investigation stemming from the October 2005 complaint was
discontinued in January 2006, after the Regional Public Prosecutor for
Viborg deemed that there were no grounds for considering the publication
of the cartoons to be in violation of either section 140 or 266 of the
Code.!' The Regional Prosecutor's decision resulted in a number of
complaints being lodged with the Director of Public Prosecutions (OPP),
who also dismissed them, finding that there were insufficient grounds to
attach criminal liability under either provisions of the Criminal Code.!"
The difficulty faced by the OPP in determining whether an offence had
occurred arose partly from the fact that there was little, if any, judicial
reasoning to apply. "Only three prosecutions have been brought for
violation of this provision and the most recent of these cases from 1971
led to acquittal."!"
Central to the OPP's decision was the definition of mockery and scorn
within the framework of the statute. In reviewing section 140 of the Code,
the OPP stated:
The concept "mockery" covers ridicule and is an expression of lack of respect
or derision of the object of mockery. "Scorn" is an expression of contempt
for the object that is scorned. It must be assumed that these words imply
ridicule or contempt with a certain element of abuse, just as it appears
from the legislative material of the Criminal Code that punishment can
be incurred only in "serious" cases. Depending on the circumstances, a
caricature of such a central figure in Islam as the Prophet Mohammed may
imply ridicule of or be considered an expression of contempt of Islamic
religious doctrines and acts of worship. An assessment of whether this is
the case must be seen in the light of the text accompanying the drawings
... Based on this text, the basic assumption must be that [yllands-Posten
commissioned the drawings for the purpose of in a provocative manner to
debate whether, in a secular society, special regard should be paid to the
religious feelings of some Muslims.P
Accordingly, the OPP found that, in context, the publication of the
cartoons was not to be considered in breach of section 140, concluding
that eight of the cartoons were either "neutral" in their expression or did
not appear to represent an expression of "derision or spiteful ridiculing
humour" towards Muslims or Islam." The OPP acknowledged that the
cartoon depicting two armed men with beards and turbans who chased a
third man could, at first sight, be understood "to be an illustration of an
element of violence in Islam or among Muslims. "22 However, he emphasised
that the caption attributed to the man being chased, who could be taken
to represent Mohammed, speaks to calm the others, "which must be taken
to be a rejection of violence". 23 Two other cartoons, both depicting women
wearing headscarves in apparent subordinate roles, were found to deal with
the position of women in Muslim societies and was an issue concerning
social conditions rather than religious doctrines or worship."
One of the most controversial of the cartoons depicted a man with a
bomb shaped turban. The OPP reasoned that a cartoon of a man wearing
a bomb shaped turban could be understood as a contribution to the
discussion about religious fanaticism motivating terrorist acts. The OPP
explained:
The drawing can therefore be seen as a contribution to the current debate
on terror and as an expression that religious fanaticism has led to terrorist
acts. Understood in this way, the drawing cannot be considered to express
contempt for the Prophet Mohammed or the Islamic religion, but as an
expression of criticism of Islamic groups who commit terrorist acts in the
name of religion.
This reasoning follows that of the OPP in 1976 to refuse to prosecute
a film director after complaints from Christian groups about the depiction
of Christ's disciples engaging in criminal activities in a published film
script, "The Jesus Movie by Thorsen". The then OPP stated, "It will also be
of importance that the aim of the film is not directed against Christian
communities or their worship, but at exposing problems to debate and
illustrate them."25 Interestingly, in the fyllands-Posten matter, the OPP
accepted that the cartoon could be interpreted to depict Mohammed as a
violent person, which could be understood to be an "affront and insult to
the Prophet who is an ideal for believing Muslims,":" however, this failed
to qualify as an offence under section 140 of the Code.











19 Ibid5. The lastconvictionwasin [938 for anti-jewishmagazinesand posters-U.
(DanishWeeklyLawReports) [938.4190
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mere depiction of Mohammed caused the cartoons to be mocking and
scornful of Muslims' beliefs because of a doctrinal prohibition against
drawing pictures of Mohammed. The DPP rejected the contention that
this prohibition was contrary to the religious doctrines and acts of worship
of Islam:
The basic assumption must be that, according to Hadith (the written
narratives of the life of the Prophet and guidelines for the conduct to be
shown by Muslims) in Islam, there is a prohibition against depicting human
figures,which also includes depicting the Prophet Mohammed. Not all
Muslims comply consistently with the ban on depiction, as there are pictures
of Mohammed dating from earlier times as well as the present."
While the purpose of section 140 is the protection of religious beliefs
connected with religious doctrines, the rationale behind section 266b of the
Code is the protection of groups of people who are threatened, scorned, or
degraded because of their religion. In deciding that there were insufficient
grounds to pursue a prosecution under section 266b, the Prosecutor found
that, taken in context, the article did not refer to Muslims generally, but
expressly refered to some Muslims:
i.e. Muslims who reject the modern, secular society and demand a special
position in relation to their own religious feelings. The latter group of people
must be considered to be comprised by the expression "a group of people" as
mentioned in section 266 b, but the text in the article cannot be considered
to be scornful or degrading towards this group - even if seen in the context
of the drawings ... Furthermore, there is no basis for assuming that the
intention was to depict Muslims in general as perpetrators of violence or
even as terrorists?'
have the tendency to shock and outrage the feelings of Christians, it not
being a blasphemy to vilify a non-Christian or member the Jewish faith."
However, Victoria, Queensland and Tasmania have all introduced or
amended legislation in the past decade to outlaw the vilification of people
because of religious beliefs.P In Queensland and Tasmania, the prohibition
on religious vilification is contained within general prohibitions of race,
religion, or sexuality;" whilst Victoria specifically prohibits conduct
which occurs "on the ground of" the religious belief or activity. The scope
of the requisite harm required under these provisions mirrors the harm
requirement in racial and other anti-vilification provisions: engaging in
activities in public that incites hatred towards, serious contempt for, or
revulsion or severe ridicule of, a person or group of persons because of
their religious beliefs or activities.P The exceptions to liability also mirror
those contained in other anti-vilification provisions.
In contrast with Denmark and other Western nations, where freedom
of speech has been given some degree of protection through constitution-
al or statutory protection of individual rights,36 free speech in Australia
is merely a residual right. That is, the freedom to speak exists only to
the extent that it is not restricted by operation of the common law or
statute. 37The operation of anti-vilification laws is thus only limited by
statutory exceptions and the breadth of interpretation of the legislation
given by the courts. However, courts and tribunals have attempted to take
the impact of the legislation on free speech into consideration, generally
by applying a narrow reading to the meaning of the requisite harm and a
broader reading of the exceptions to liability.
Would publication of the fyllands-Posten cartoons violate these
provisions? The prohibitions on religious vilification require that the
action "incites" others to cause the requisite harm, but there has been a
32 R v Gathercole (1838) 2 Lewin 237.
33 Queensland - s.124AAnti-Discrimination Act 1991; Tasmania - s. 19 Anti-Discrimination
Act 1998; Victoria - s.8 Racial And Religious Tolerance Act 2001. Private member bills
introduced into the New South Wales and South Australia Parliaments in 2004 to amend
anti-discrimination legislation to make religious vilification unlawful were defeated. In
1994, the New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Act was amended to expand the definition
of race to include "ethno-religious" group. However, the scope of this provision has been
limited to "a strong association between a person's or a group's nationality or ethnicity, culture,
history and his, her or its religious beliefs and practices": Khan v Commisioner, Department of
Corrective Services & anor [2002] NSW ADT 131
34 The Queensland legislation also prohibits vilification because of gender identity:
s.124A.
35 The South Australian legislation includes the added requirement that the incitement
must "threaten physical harm": s. 4 Racial Vilification Act 1996 (SA).
36 Including USA, Canada, UK, NZ, South Africa.
37 This is modified to an extent by the implied constitutional freedom to discuss matters
of political and governmental concern recognised by the High Court: see Lange v Australian
Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, [1997] HCA 25; Coleman v Power (2004)
220 CLR I; [2004] HCA 39. However the impact of the implied freedom in extending or
guarding free speech "rights" has, in practice, been minimal and anti-vilification laws have
been found to not be invalidated by that implied constitutional freedom: Kazak v John
Faufax Publications Ltd [2000] NSWADT 77.
In reaching the decision not to proceed with a prosecution of fyllands-
Posten, considerable weight was attached to the fact that the article
concerned a matter of public interest "which means that there is an
extended access to make statements without these statements constituting
a criminal offence. "29
Unlike Denmark, blasphemy laws are not relevant to Islam in Australia.
Blasphemous libel prohibits the publication of material that exposes the
Christian religion to vilification, scurrility, ridicule, and contempt. In
most Australian jurisdictions-" it remains a common law misdemeanour,
punishable by fine or imprisonment, to publish words concerning the
Christian religion "which are so scurrilous and offensive as to pass the
limits of decent controversy and to be calculated to outrage the feelings
of any sympathiser with or believer in Christianity". 31The material must
27 Ibid 6.
28 Ibid 9.
29 Above n 15.
30 In New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory the offence has been
statutorily modified to provide that prosecutions cannot proceed where there is no purpose
of scoffing or reviling or violating public decency.
31 Ogle V Strickland (1987) 71 ALR 41 per Fischer [at 71, citing R v Gott (1922) 16 Cr
App R 87.
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lack of consistency in defining the requisite degree of fault. A number of
decisions have applied a subjective test, requiring an intention to achieve
the requisite harm." However, the weight of recent decisions indicates
that the test to be applied is an objective one. In Islamic Council of Victoria
v Catch the Fire Ministries Inc.,39 Higgins J, in considering section 8 of the
Racial And Religious ToleranceAct (Vic), applied the reasoning ofthe NSW
Administrative Decisions Tribunal (ADT) in John Fairfax Publications Pry
Ltd v Kazak,4° where the Tribunal reasoned that:
in the context of vilification provisions the question is, could the ordinary
reasonable reader understand from the public act that he/she is being incited
to hatred towards or serious contempt for or serious ridicule of a person
on the grounds of race? The question is not, could the ordinary reasonable
reader reach such a conclusion, only after his/her own beliefs have been
brought into play by the public act."
Could publication of the cartoons be considered incitement under this
objective view? The legislative requirement of hatred, serious contempt,
or revulsion or severe ridicule indicates an intention by legislatures to
address only the most serious forms of vilifying speech. In Kazak v John
Fairfax Publications Pry Ltd,42 the NSW ADT considered not only Australian
authorities, but also looked to New Zealand and Canadian authorities
for the meaning given to the words "hatred" and "contempt". The ADT
quoted with approval the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal in Nealy Il.
Johnston 43
With "hatred" the focus is a set of emotions and feelings which involve
extreme ill will towards another person or group of persons. To say that one
"hates" another means in effect that one finds no redeeming qualities in the
latter. It is a term, however, which does not necessarily involve the mental
process of "looking down" on another or others. It is quite possible to "hate"
someone who one feels is superior to one in intelligence, wealth or power
... "Contempt" is by contrast a term which suggests a mental process of
"looking down" upon or treating as inferior the object of one's feelings. This
is captured by the dictionary definition relied on in Taylor ... in the use of
the terms "despised", "dishonour" or "disgrace"."
Would the fyllands-Posten cartoons meet this threshold? While it is
expected that many Muslims would find the cartoons offensive, would they
incite the "ordinary reasonable person" to hatred towards, serious contempt
for, or revulsion or severe ridicule of Muslims? Religious vilification is not
a recent phenomenon in Australia's history. Reflecting the dominance of
Protestantism in colonial Australian society, Catholicism was a popular
target," and anti-Semitism remains a serious problem. However, in the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the United States in September
2001, the divide between Islam and Christianity became a major issue in
Australian society, with an undercurrent of anger against, and contempt
for, Muslims sweeping through public opinion and the mainstream media
in Australia and most Western nations. The cartoons present a portrayal of
Islam and Mohammed that arose in the context of a debate in Denmark On
intolerance and self-censorship, accompanied by comment on an issue that
was a matter of local public debate. However, taken out of that context,
and looked at from the perspective of Australian society, the cartoons could
be considered to be reinforcing a misinformed and stereotypical view of
the relationship between Islam and terrorism.
Liability for a vilifying act can be avoided if the act was done, or thing
said, reasonably and in good faith for, inter alia, artistic, academic, or
scientific purposes or for purposes seen to be in the public interest, including
public debate about matters of public concern." The exemptions aim to
prevent the restriction of speech that, although likely to offend, is done
reasonably and in good faith." Is a cartoon an artistic work within the scope
of anti-vilification legislation? Bropho Il Human Rights & Equal Opportunity
Commission'" involved the consideration of whether the publication of a
cartoon vilified indigenous Australians under Commonwealth legislation.
The Court considered the outcome of the initial inquiry conducted
by HREOC into the complaint of racial vilification. In that inquiry,
Commissioner Innes reasoned that cartoons were artistic works:
it seems to me that there is no doubt that a cartoon is an artistic work in the
sense intended by the legislators. Putting aside for the moment any views
as to the content of the cartoon, the drawings and words relating to them
are works of artistic merit ... Cartoons, as with paintings, drawings and
sculpture are widely accepted by society as works of art 4"
The Commissioner, however, acknowledged that difficulties would arise
where a court or tribunal attempted to consider whether artistic merit was
a necessary element of the exception, distinguishing between "real" and
45 Over 75%of the population of the colonies in the early 19th century were Protestant.
The Catholic Church in Australiawas subject to colonialgovernment control during the
early 19th century. The first publicMasswas not permitted until 1803, and were again
prohibited in 1804 followingthe Castle Hill uprising by Irish convicts. The prohibition
remained until 1820. See generallyP O'Farrell, The Catholic Church and Community in
Australia: A History (1985).
46 Queensland - s.124A (2) Anti-Discrimination Act 1991; Tasmania - s. 55 Anti-
Discrimination Act 1998; Victoria - s.ll Racial And Religious Tolerance Act 200 I.
47 Albert Corunna II West Australian Newspapers (200 I) HREOC 8.104.
48 [2004] FCAFC 16.
49 Albert Corunna v West Australian Newspaper Ltd, Decision 117, 12 April 200, Cited in
Bropho v HREOC [2004] FCAFC16 by French L para 40. The appellant had not appealed
that aspect of the Commissioner's decision, so the Federal Court found It l.lllnecessary to
consider this matter further. AlsoseeJudeh II Jewish National Fund of Austmlia Inc [2003]
VCAT 1254, para 47.
38 Hellenic Council of New South Wales v Apoleski and Macedonian Youth Association
(No 1) [1995J NSWEOT (25 September 1997);Hellenic Council of New South Wales v
Apoleski (No 2) [1995] NSWEOT (25 September 1997); Malco v Massaris [1996J NSWEOT
(12 February 1998).
39 [2003J VCAT 1753.
40 [2002] NSW ADTAP35.
41 Ibid 16.
42 [2000] NSWADT 77.
43 (1989) to C.H.R.R. D/6450
44 Ibid D/6469.
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"pseudo" artistic works. 50 Leaving the determination of artistic merit to the
court's discretion would suggest that artistic merit is a measurable quantity
able to be discerned by the judiciary, a questionable assumption.t! In Bryl
v Melbourne Theatre.? Commissioner Johnston, referring to the artistic
purpose exception under the Victorian legislation, said:
AB I understand the import of section I8D, it is not intended as a charter
for governmental bodies like the [Human Rights and EqualOpportunity]
Commissionto draw up standards or a rule book layingdownwhat is
acceptable in the wayan artistic work is produced .. 53
If the artistic purpose exception can be seen as encompassing works
such as cartoons, the question then turns to whether the publication of
thefyllands-Posten cartoons would have been reasonable and in good faith.
In Bropha, French J stated
An act is done reasonably in relation to statements, publications, discussions
or debates for genuine academic, artistic or scientificpurposes, if it bears
a rational relationship to those purposes. The publication of a genuine
scientificpaper on the topic of genetic differencesbetween particular human
populations might, for one reason or another, be insulting or offensiveto a
group of people. Its discussionat a scientificconferencewould no doubt be
reasonable. Its presentation to a meeting convenedby a racist organisation
and its use to support a view that a particular group of persons is morallyor
otherwise 'inferior' to another by reason of their race or ethnicity, may not
be a thing reasonably done in relation to para (b) of s.18D.54
French J went on to explain that a person will act reasonably if they,
viewed objectively, have conscientiously acted in a way designed to
minimise the offence or insult, humiliation or intimidation suffered by
people affected by it.
On the other hand, a person who exercisesthe freedom carelessly
disregardingor wilfullyblind to its effect upon peoplewhowill be hurt by
it or in such a way as to enhance that hurt may be found not to have been
acting in good faith."
Although cartoons may be considered a form of artistic expression, where
the purpose of a cartoon is the making of a political statement or comment,
its reasonableness will be judged by reference to the circumstances of
publication. Applying this reasoning, the publication of the cartoons,
removed from the context of the public debate on self-censorship that
occurred in Denmark, would not likely meet the requisite standard
of reasonableness. However, the reasonableness of publication of the
cartoons in Australia would have changed once the controversy over
their publication by [yllands-Posten became a matter of public discussion.
International media coverage of the publication, and the subsequent
protests, would have arguably changed the context of publication, with
public debate of issues concerning freedom of speech and religious
intolerance creating a "rational relationship" between the cartoons and
the public interest.
An interesting issue arising from this is whether a finding of unreason-
ableness could, in itself, change the context of publication. Using the
reasoning in Bropho, it is arguable that, if the cartoons had been published
in Australia and had been found to amount to a vilifying action that was
not reasonable in the circumstances, a subsequent republication could
be defended on the basis that the refusal made the cartoons a matter of
public interest.
If the international protests would have made the publication of the
cartoons "reasonable," why didn't the Australian media publish them? In
contrast with Europe, Australian media outlets were generally restrained
in republishing the fyllands-Posten cartoons. Media coverage in Australia
was, in general, limited to the reporting of, and commentary about, the
publication of the cartoons and the subsequent controversy, although
this did seem to focus disproportionately on incidences of violence. Only
two newspapers'" chose to republish any of the offending cartoons" The
restraint shown by the media ultimately resulted in the lawfulness of the
cartoons under religious vilification provisions not being tested. However,
was this self-censorship itself an unreasonable burden on free speech?
Ultimately, it is necessary to distinguish the motives for self-censorship.
Since the primary purpose of the news media is to provide information,
self-censorship is likely a rare occurrence. Where it does occur, the exercise
of editorial discretion in determining whether to publish or report, whether
based on a cultural or religious sensitivity, or on other considerations,
freedom of speech is burdened. Like anti-vilification laws, this burden
can be justifiable, within limits, if its purpose is the achievement of
such ideas as the promotion of social equality and tolerance. However,
the reasonableness of the burden must be measured by the motive.
Self-censorship imposes an unreasonable burden where it arises from
uncertainty in the law, or occurs in response to pressure applied from
those with an interest in preventing publication, the so-called "heckler's
veto," which occurs when an individual's, or a group's, right to freedom of
speech is curtailed due to a reacting party's conduct. The common example
is that of demonstrators causing a public speech to be disrupted. Or the
threat of retaliatory violence."
56 The Rockhampton Morning Bulletin and Brisbane's Courier-Mail each published one of the
offending cartoons. See <http://www.theage.com.au/news/world/second-australian-paper-
publishes-cartoon /2006/02/08/1139074274027.html> accessed 29 September 2006.
57 However, the twelve cartoons were easily accessible via the Internet from web sites
located outside of Australia, for example <http://blog.newspaperindex.com/2005/12/IO/un-
to-investigate-jyllands-posten-racisrn!>. . . . .
58 Media reports indicate that the Australian government was Itself gUIlty of attemptmg
50 Brophov HREOC [2004] FCAFC 16 by French], para 40.
51 j Robb, "Censor and be Damned!"18(3) Artlink 15-16,16.
52 [1999] HREOCA II, 21 June 1999.
53 Ibid para 4.3.




Although some research>? suggests that Australia's anti-vilification laws
have, for the most part, been successful, the extent to which these laws
have produced a long-term change in the nature or extent of vilification
of minorities is yet to be determined. But anti-vilification laws are a fact
of life. The extent of debate about the necessity or desirability of anti-
vilification laws is itself an indicator of the health of some aspects of free
speech in Australia. But because of the delicate position of free speech, it
is essential that governments and courts ensure that the burdens imposed
on free speech by these laws are not unreasonable.
REGULATING HATE SPEECH
Asaf Fisher*
InNew York Times v Sullivan I Justice Brennan, who delivered the opinionof the United States Supreme Court, held that the First Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States embodies a "commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials"." Justice
Kirby would, some three and a half decades later, echo these remarks in
Roberts v Bass' observing that whilst the philosophical ideal may be that
"political discourse should be based only upon objective facts, noble ideas
and temperate beliefs,' in reality, rationality often gives way to "passionate
and sometimes irrational and highly charged interchange". Extending
the shield of the First Amendment, and, in the Australian context, the
implied freedom of political communication, to offensive, subversive and
even outrageous speech is a measure as well as a test of our commitment
to the cardinal principle that, in an open and democratic society, freedom
of speech or political communication should be uninhibited.
Hate speech directed at racial or ethnic groups is a particularly
pernicious form of speech, manifestations of which include racial epithets
such as "nigger" and "kike", The underlying message of hate speech is
that members of particular racial or ethnic groups are inferior. Hate
speech causes emotional as well as psychological distress and, in extreme
cases, incites violence against members of the racial or ethnic groups at
which it is targetted. Many liberal democracies, including Australia, have
proscribed hate speech. Racial vilification is unlawful in most of the states
and territories of Australia. 5 Critics opposed to the regulation of hate speech
adopt the logic of First Amendment jurisprudence, albeit selectively, to
argue that the proscription of hate speech is a threat to freedom of speech
or, in the Australian context, political communication. In the United
States, statutes regulating hate speech have twice been struck down by
the Supreme Court." However, the issue of the constitutionality of racial
vilification statutes has not yet come before Australia's High Court.
• BA Com. LLB (Hans) University of Technology, Sydney.
I New York Times v Sullivan, 1 376 U.S. 254, 1964,270 per Brennan} delivering the
opinion of the court.
2 (2002) 212 CLR I.
3 Roberts v Bass (2002) 212 CLR 1,62-63 per Kirby J.
4 Ibid.
5 Refer to the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW). the Racial Vilification Act 1996 (SA),
the Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT), the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) and the Criminal
Code (WA).
6 R.A. V v City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 1992 and Virginia v Black 538 U.S. 343,2003.
to impose a heckler's veto by warning the media that they threatened Australia's economic
security by putting international trade at risk if the Jyllands-Posten cartoons were
published. See < http://www.asiamedia. uda.edu/article-pacificislands.asp ?parentid= 38493 >
accessed 29 September 2006
59 Mandy Tibbey, "Developments in Anti-Vilification Law" Australian Bar Review 8
August 2001; Nancy Hennessy and Paula Smith, "Have We Got it Right? NSW Racial
Vilification Laws Five Years On" Australian Journal oj Human Rights, 1994/1.
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